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From Trade to Empire in the Near East – III: The Uses of the Residency at Baghdad, 1794–1804

Edward Ingram

> There is certainly something peculiar in the atmosphere of Baghdad and Basra that diplomatises the heads of all the Company's residents there.
>
> Sir Henry Ellis[1]

A hazard of social life in the second British Empire was the predominance of Presbyterian Scots. Dour, energetic, and thrifty, encouraged and helped by Henry Dundas, president of the board of control, and his collaborator at East India House, David Scott, at the end of the eighteenth century they swarmed over India, each hoping to return to set up in society. To this day throughout white dominions one meets their scattered descendants, those who, although fortunate enough never to return home to some inhospitable or barren glen, parade in defiant and unrecognisable tartans an heritage never theirs. Such illusions must be cherished: the British Empire was their monument. Unfortunately, and uncomfortably for Sir Harford Jones, first resident of the East India Company at Baghdad, he happened to have been born in Wales. He had a second fault. Most Scots were Tories, and in a Tory age he was suspected of being a Whig.[2]

When Harold Nicolson criticised Lord Curzon as foreign secretary for being too Asiatic, he meant that Curzon, preferring not to intervene in Europe, and determined no other European state should intervene in Asia, refused to recognise Britain's most vital interest in providing security for France.[3] Curzon was not alone in this. Most English ministers were more suspicious of France than Germany; had been so throughout the nineteenth century; and for good reason. Britain's greatness was achieved from fighting France, at the expense of her world power: its continuance depended on not choosing between European and Asiatic commitments. Grey had chosen. Curzon, at the end of a supposedly victorious war, could hardly have been asked to admit that the result of choosing had been failure. It had, of course; Britain's greatness depended upon there being a balance of power, not on being strong enough to maintain it. If Britain were to buttress France in Europe, there was no point to France. The British were in an acute dilemma: acting in defence of interests itself threatened them. In Asia their dilemma was more acute. In the nineteenth century power in the near east never had been balanced.

As Castlereagh explained in his celebrated reply to the protocol of Troppau, the British react to changes in the foreign policy of states.[4] Neither revolution nor rearmament is seen as threatening. This was true in the late nineteenth century of the German navy. Building it did not offend the British, until German policy during the Moroccan crisis appeared to imply, that Germany considered herself capable of overawing all the states of central and western Europe.[5] This was also the implication of Napoleon's victories. There was an identical prerequisite; that Russia should be enticed or driven out of Europe, and Britain alarmed for the security of India. The hegemony of France or

Germany depended upon Anglo-Russian hostility in the east. Throughout the Napoleonic wars the British disregarded the expansion of Russia in Asia. They chose and needed to believe, that the Russians could be persuaded to understand their interest, and certainly their responsibility, in re-establishing the balance of power in Europe, because the British were unable to, and ought not to be asked to try.

I

The British demonstrated that their interests in the near east had changed from commercial to political in 1798. Although they had long been aware of the dangers from a French connection with Egypt,[6] when Bonaparte invaded, they had to decide how to counteract them. In Egypt and Syria Bonaparte intruded between the Levant Company's commercial sphere of influence in the Mediterranean and the East India Company's in the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. To counter-attack Bonaparte the British followed him. Until the French revolutionary wars the British ambassador at Constantinople had been chosen and paid by the Levant Company. His diplomatic duties were one of the fees paid by the company for their monopoly. In 1798 these duties were shared. The new ambassador, the earl of Elgin, was to act for the foreign department, his secretary of embassy, John Spencer Smith, for the company.[7] The result was bitterness, confusion, and wrangling. In 1804 the foreign department accepted complete responsibility for the embassy, and the company's business was transferred to a consul-general.[8]

More significant and contentious was the appointment of Harford Jones to be resident of the East India Company at Baghdad. At the board of control Dundas was certain, that if Bonaparte had invaded or should invade Syria, he would be capable of marching to India. The foreign department, who scoffed at Dundas's alarm, and were determined not to be distracted from Italy and Germany, rejected all suggestions to negotiate a triple alliance for the defence of British India with the Turks and Russians.[9] To provide some opposition to Bonaparte in Turkey, and to obtain information independently of the foreign department, the board of control persuaded the secret committee to establish the residency at Baghdad, and to pay the resident a salary high enough to prevent his needing to trade.[10]

The resident's duties were exclusively political: they were intended to be equally restricted. Dundas wanted to drive the French out of the near east, and prevent their obtaining undue influence, not to replace their influence by British: the near east was best visualised as empty desert, inhabited by ghosts of Nebuchadnezzar, Crassus, and Cleopatra. The self-deception was sensible, because the appointment of Jones established the first rule of the Great Game in Asia; that interests in the near east expand to fill the space available for action. Jones was sent to Baghdad in response to a temporary emergency in Egypt. By 1801 he had conjured a permanent threat from the Caucasus.

This featureless desert had been permitted one feature, the direct route for the post.[11] The East India Company had sent despatches to India overland across Turkey since the middle of the seventeenth century. For eighty years, until after the establishment of a factory at Basra in 1723, they arrived no more quickly than by sea around the Cape of Good Hope. Rarely did they need less

than six months, often eight to ten. There were two reasons for the attempts made in the middle of the century to reduce this time. Trade in the Persian Gulf was fiercely competitive. In 1738 the French established a consulate at Basra; a Dutch consul was there until 1754. Secondly, starting with the war of the Austrian succession, the probability that Anglo-French hostility in Europe would result in a struggle for mastery in India meant, that to prevent the enemy's obtaining the strategic advantage, news of the outbreak of European wars would be urgently needed at Calcutta. After 1748 banking houses were appointed agents of the East India Company at Vienna, Constantinople, and Aleppo, and charged with forwarding despatches. As a result the time taken was reduced usually to five months, often to three or four.[12]

The service was interrupted during the seven years' war, but not by the Franco-Austrian alliance,[13] and again reorganised. There was no hindrance at Vienna, where the Austrians were courteous enough to forward despatches to governments with whom they were at war. The Arabs, often at the instigation of the French, who were less courteous, plundered messengers between Basra and Aleppo. Between 1756 and 1760 most packets sent overland were lost. The alternative of sending the post by boat upstream to Baghdad, then by official Ottoman tartar to Constantinople, was safer but erratic. A second possibility proved more successful. From 1761, until the service was again disrupted by plague and Persian invasions ten years later, despatches were routed from Basra to Baghdad, then by the short desert route to Aleppo, assumed and proving to be safer.[14]

H. L. Hoskins, interested primarily in Egypt, assumed that the direct route was introduced as an alternative to the overland route, after George Baldwin had failed in his first attempt to promote British trade to Suez from India.[15] The opposite was true. The East India Company were interested in the overland route only if it might prove the cheaper. In 1760 they experimented by sending despatches simultaneously by both routes. Each was exceptionally slow: both packets arrived after eight months, the one through Baghdad first by thirteen days.[16] A second experiment in 1777 proved the overland route the quicker, unless despatches were sent by express messenger between Constantinople and Aleppo. Unfortunately hiring express messengers would diminish the principal attraction of the direct route, its lower costs.[17] Because the East India Company feared the political complications and the competition likely to result from trading between India and Suez, despite the obvious attraction of the overland route, that more of it was at sea and therefore more easily protected, in 1779 the company decided that as previously despatches should be sent only through Basra.[18]

The overland route renewed its challenge in 1786, when Baldwin returned to Cairo as consul-general, and again failed when he failed to promote the overland trade. After the American rebellion the board of control decided, in preparation for defending British India from France, to improve both routes.[19] Efforts were made to reduce the time taken between Constantinople and Basra to less than four weeks, and in 1792 the East India Company, abandoning their practice of relying upon banking houses, appointed their own agents at Constantinople and Aleppo. Improving the direct route became increasingly urgent as Grenville grew determined to recall Baldwin. In 1793 the board enquired whether the company might revive more successfully the experiment

of sending despatches from Constantinople to Basra through Baghdad. His support of this plan brought Harford Jones to the notice of Henry Dundas.

Since his arrival in India in 1784, Jones had been assistant to the resident at Basra, Samuel Manesty. In 1793, during a protracted dispute with the local Turkish authorities, Manesty evacuated the residency to Kuwait. The pasha of Baghdad retaliated by persuading the Porte to demand Manesty's recall. When the British ambassador agreed, Manesty protested that employees of the East India Company were not responsible to the foreign department. This was true; except that Manesty's profitable private trade had depended upon the immunities granted a consul.[20] The dispute foreshadowed a sequence between the pasha and the resident at Baghdad. To the board of control it was peculiarly irritating, because both overland routes might be simultaneously disrupted in the midst of a war with France. In consequence in January 1796 Manesty was recalled. His reappointment nine months later was owing to the efforts on his behalf at London of Harford Jones.

In 1794 Jones, whose health had been deteriorating at Basra, decided to take leave in England, and offered to mediate at East India House between Manesty and the government of Bombay. He was successful on Manesty's behalf, more so on his own. He married; made useful and influential friends at East India House in Sir Hugh Inglis,[21] and James Willis;[22] and prepared for his appointment as resident at Baghdad by a plan for changing the direct route for the post.

The direct route was divided into three stages; from Bombay to Basra by sea, from Basra to Constantinople by tartar, and from Constantinople to London by the German mail. Jones firstly analysed the service between Basra and Bombay. From October to April vessels calling at Muscat and Bushire needed between twenty-five and thirty days to reach Basra. From late April throughout May the start of the north-west winds increased this to forty days, and from June to September the time was further increased to between sixty and seventy-five. The winds were unalterable, even by the British, but the East India Company's schedules might be improved. Jones calculated that if mail boats bypassed Bushire, and dropped packets for the resident there at Kharrack, nine days might be saved. The service might also be accelerated by stationing cruisers at Basra. This measure was less extravagant than it might appear. The alternative was to charter vessels whenever packets from London happened to arrive. Four vessels chartered between 1783 and 1792 cost 82,000 rupees.[23]

The journey up the Persian Gulf was faster in winter, across the desert faster in summer. Jones allowed sixteen days for crossing the Great Desert between Basra and Aleppo, twelve between Aleppo and Constantinople, and varying times at Aleppo while tartars were procured. This route was fast enough but hazardous. Without friendly relations with the pasha of Aleppo, procuring tartars was impossible; then they were often overburdened with private correspondence and valuables. This made them more tempting to the Arabs, who at any distance from towns refused to acknowledge Ottoman suzerainty. In consequence, out of every twelve packets, Jones calculated that three were plundered but returned, one plundered and not returned, one lost, and seven safely delivered.

The alternative route through Baghdad might prove safer, and the time

taken be more accurately predicted. Jones allowed six days between Basra and Baghdad, assuming that when the Tigris was in flood packets could be sent downstream by boat; one day at Baghdad, while they were delivered to the pasha's official couriers, who went to Constantinople and back twice each month; and seventeen between Baghdad and Constantinople. This service, according to Jones, would be less interrupted, because the riverain tribes were settled and policed by the pasha, and the time taken might be reliably predicted at twenty-four days, whereas sending packets through Aleppo would require a varying number exceeding twenty-eight. Allowing the German mail twenty-two days between Constantinople and London, even during the slowest season in the Persian Gulf packets ought to arrive regularly from Bombay in three months.[24]

For corroboration of Jones's analysis, Dundas turned to William Eton, in youth Dutch consul at Basra, now known for his books on the Ottoman Empire, and during the first coalition one of Dundas's principal advisers about the near east, who was aware that the East India Company, no longer responsible for formulating policies and strategy but obliged to pay for them, would be as concerned abouts costs as speed. Because the French and Dutch had used Baghdad, Eton agreed that it might be preferable as a stage to Aleppo; also that cruisers should be stationed at Basra to improve the service in the Persian Gulf.[25] Between London and Basra the cost and the speed would be affected by the type of messenger employed. Packets of great importance had often been entrusted to special messengers. The company admitted that they might in emergency be necessary between London and Constantinople, because the Austrians, although they forwarded despatches efficiently, habitually first read them. At Constantinople forwarding secret despatches should be entrusted to the ambassador;[26] between Constantinople and Basra to tartars, who could travel more quickly and safely than Englishmen.

In commenting upon Jones's suggestions, Eton considered four services through Baghdad. The first was by the German mail to Constantinople, by the pasha's tartars to Baghdad, and by Arab messenger to Basra, in forty-six to fifty-six days at trifling cost. The second, using an express tartar beyond Constantinople, would guarantee delivery at Basra in forty-six days, the time expected by Jones, but increase the cost to £60–80 a packet. This increase was marginal compared to the cost of special messengers sent from London. Sending one to Constantinople, followed by a regular tartar beyond, would not reduce the time below forty-six days, but raise the cost to £700–800. Finally, sending a special messenger all the way to Basra would raise the cost to heights the company hesitated even to calculate, and increase the time taken to sixty-eight days. Englishmen, however dedicated to the public service, could not be asked to cross the desert with the ease of Arabs.[27]

Eton, as Manesty already had, and Jones would presently upon his arrival at Baghdad, illustrated the difficulty of limiting the objectives of policy in the near east to the means and funds available for their achievement. The company, who were anxious to limit their involvement in near eastern politics, were continually opposed by their employees. Eton argued that a reliable service would depend upon pre-eminent British influence in Baghdad and the Persian Gulf. In a rehearsal for one of John Malcolm's longest running performances, he explained that the best method of policing the gulf would be by occupying

and fortifying Kharrack. If the residency were moved there from Bushire, the base could become a bazaar as well as a fortress. To obtain equivalent influence over the Turks, in addition to the residency at Basra, a residency should be established at Baghdad.[28] Eton was caught in what became an inescapable British dilemma. Whereas the post could not be improved without influence, nor influence obtained without a show of strength, the residents depended upon the show, for which they were intended to substitute.

As a result of this enquiry, the government of Bombay were instructed to introduce a monthly service to Basra, and to pay for it, as Baldwin had suggested,[29] by charges on private letters. This proved more controversial than the East India Company expected. The Baghdad route turned out to be no quicker than the route through Aleppo. It was, however, safer. Between 1798 and 1805 only two of 148 packets sent through Baghdad were badly damaged. Sixteen sent through Aleppo were plundered between 1801 and 1803.[30] The figures, however, are suspect, as they were compiled by Jones, who had a vested interest in praising Baghdad and abusing Aleppo. The route proved slower than Jones had claimed, because the pasha's tartars increased their income by carrying small parcels, often jewels, for Armenian merchants at Baghdad, and naturally preferred the safety of a caravan.[31] If despatches were to travel quickly enough to warrant a monthly service to Basra, they had to be sent to Constantinople by express messenger, and this dramatically raised the cost.

Between July 1793 and December 1797 Bombay spent 150,000 rupees in sending packets through Basra. Between January 1798 and April 1800, after the introduction of the monthly service, the charges on private letters earned a profit of 32,000 rupees.[32] The East India Company were not impressed. As long as Wellesley was governor-general, they had great difficulty in learning what was happening in India.

> Our acquiescence in the proposed plan of a monthly overland despatch from India for conveyance of private letters [said the court of directors] was principally induced by the expectation of a regular communication from our respective governments of every material intelligence respecting the state of our affairs. Instead of which we have great reason to complain of the defectiveness of such communication.[33]

If, when no despatches were included, packets were not sent express, the profits from charges on private letters would increase.[34]

The government of Bombay realised that, however attractive, this reasoning was false. The company were particularly offended by a packet in 1800 sent express from Basra to Constantinople, then by special messenger to London, at a cost of £900, and containing nothing but private letters.[35] Bombay, who warned Manesty and Jones not to send packets express without instructions from Wellesley, knew that this restriction would ruin the chance of profits. If private letters were sent by regular tartar, and only occasional despatches express, they would be sent instead by sea, which was not much slower, while cheaper and more reliable.[36] Instead of earning Bombay income, the overland post would become prohibitively expensive. The solution was not to reduce the number of private letters, but to compel Wellesley to write more frequent and informative despatches.

Packets were sent express because the regular service was erratic. Baghdad developed the faults Jones had bewailed in Aleppo. Manesty at Basra and Jones at Baghdad, who had been sent partly to supervise and improve the post, instead interrupted it. Their presence did not increase Britain's influence in the near east; but diminished it by their quarrels with successive pashas.[37] The pashas' method of retaliating was to delay the tartars for Constantinople.[38] Jones had tried to obtain the right to hire tartars himself, but the office was profitable and the pasha's ministers made money from its sale. Jones finally decided, that if the East India Company expected regular delivery, they must establish their own service across Turkey.[39] This would have caused more problems than it solved. A protracted struggle against the pasha of Baghdad for influence at Constantinople would be needed to obtain the Porte's permission. What they might permit they could not protect, nor could Bombay without greater intervention and expense than the company would tolerate. The post, as trade, tended less to promote stability than demand it. Jones understood this, and had the answer. Because of Britain's increasing political and strategic interests there, Baghdad was to be declared a British protectorate.

II

Had Messrs Howard and Wyndham, in the days before they surrendered to television and bingo, known of the bickering of British agents in the near east during the second and third coalitions, they might have staged, perhaps at the Theatre Royal, Newcastle, an oriental Cinderella, starring 'Boy' Malcolm as Cinders, Jones and Manesty as the Ugly Sisters, and who else but Wellesley as Prince Charming? Wellesley had no glass slipper. What he offered was more highly prized, promotion and fame. Jones and Manesty, who went unnoticed, quarrelled incessantly: they forgot their quarrels whenever it was necessary to oppose Malcolm. This was not mere spleen; they held an alternative view of Britain's interests in the near east. As the two resident British representatives in the area, they argued that a policy must be formulated to counter the expansion of Russia in the Caucasus. Each was equally certain he was the obvious man to implement it.

Jones had been sent to Baghdad by Dundas to encourage the Ottoman authorities to attack Bonaparte. From the moment the French army landed in Egypt, and not as Dundas had expected in Syria, the political importance of Jones's mission diminished. Jones hoped to increase it by his proposal of an alliance with Zeman Shah, which he claimed might defend British India against European invasion without embarrassing Britain's relations with the Turks. Unfortunately, at the moment Dundas was prepared to act on this suggestion, Wellesley was sending Malcolm to Persia, to persuade the shah to divert the amir from Hindustan, while Wellesley partitioned Oudh and prepared to overawe the Marathas.[40] Wellesley needed the enmity of the amir, and courted the shah to add substance to a shadow. Jones doubted whether Zeman Shah was as powerful as Wellesley pretended, and claimed that only an embassy to Kabul could find out. If he were 'really the formidable power some people represent,' said Jones 'my life to a China orange that he is not to be kept out of India by Fath Ali'.[41]

The difference between Jones and Wellesley was clearly catalogued in an exchange of letters early in 1800 between Manesty at Basra and Malcolm, who had arrived at Bushire at the start of his mission to Teheran, and believed that Manesty had been tutored by Jones. Malcolm's particular object, he told Manesty, was to prevent Zeman Shah's disturbing Oudh '*for a period*', which could be most easily arranged by 'the *din* of preparation the Persian quarter'. Disputing Khorassan might sufficiently occupy both Zeman and Fath Ali. Beyond this, Malcolm was to improve Britain's relations with Persia, who might 'under many possible events, become a useful ally'.[42]

This vague statement disguised Wellesley's policy of expansion. Manesty, who assumed it to refer to the danger of French invasion, of which he was sceptical,[43] replied that 'neither the commercial nor political interests of Great Britain in Persia are worthy of very particular attention'. Turning to Malcolm's particular object, he added that as 'Zeman Shah, whose government for an Asiatic one is stable, is, in power, so infinitely superior to Fath Ali ..., he cannot look upon him as a formidable enemy'.[44] A mission to Kabul was more likely than one to Teheran to restrain Zeman for the required period. A connection with Persia would rather encourage him to invade India at exactly the wrong moment.

Unknown to Manesty and Malcolm, they were in agreement. Malcolm expected no more help from Persia in resisting European invasion than Jones expected from the pasha of Baghdad.[45] The weakness, poverty, and barrenness, of Persia were her contribution to India's defence.[46] Malcolm was aware that this definition of Britain's interests would not be acceptable to Wellesley, whose aims were revealed by Malcolm's answer to Manesty. Wellesley planned, after he had destroyed Tipu Sultan, 'to improve the political and commercial state of the British territories in India, and recent events made it impossible that Persia could be overlooked'.[47] Here was a rare glimpse of Wellesley's true purpose: the threat of French invasion was to be used to justify a connection with Persia, as it had been used to justify war against Mysore, and was to justify war with the Marathas.[48] How close this connection should be, and the best method of increasing British influence, were what Wellesley had sent Malcolm to find out.

Malcolm knew that he disagreed with Wellesley, and admitted that he would not risk by opposing him this opportunity to make his name. Wellesley was a tyrant, and tyrants must be flattered.[49] 'My recognition of his extraordinary judgement,' said Malcolm 'no less than my own sense of duty, has always led me ... to be more solicitous about executing his orders than investigating their propriety.'[50] 'Really great men' retorted Manesty, spotting the weakness in Wellesley's system, 'listen to all suggestions with attention, and frequently benefit very essentially from the wisdom of their conduct in doing so.'[51] Because Manesty believed that Wellesley was wasting his opportunity, this was not merely pique at being ignored.[52] The best way to exploit the increased strength and reputation earned by destroying Tipu Sultan, was to convince Zemen Shah that hostility to the British was foolish, by persuading him to receive a British resident at Kabul. While the amir controlled Pshawar and Sind, he was an Indian power, and influence over him would turn British India into the successor to the Mogul Empire. However sensible, the policy was impolitic. Expansion had to be disguised behind

threats of invasion, from Mysore, Afghanistan, and Egypt, or the East India Company would perceive what Wellesley had in mind.

In 1799 and 1800 Jones and Manesty had argued against Malcolm, that the best method of defending British India against French invasion, and of extending Britain's paramountcy throughout India, was a connection with Zeman Shah. Britain's interests in the near east changed decisively in 1801, as Harford Jones was the first to understand, when Russia annexed Georgia.[53] Restricting the expansion of Russia in the Caucasus would require a connection with Persia, rather than Afghanistan, but Jones and Malcolm disagreed about the form it should take.

When Malcolm reached Teheran in November 1800, he negotiated a defensive alliance with the shah against the French and the Afghans.[54] Or so the British thought: the shah, reading in the first article, that 'conditions of mutual aid and assistance between the two states shall be instituted, and all causes of hatred and hostility shall be banished', expected the British to support Persia against Russia.[55] Thus began an argument, lasting until the Anglo-Russian *entente*, about whether the defence of India would be better served by the continuing weakness or rejuvenation of Persia.

One week after Pitt the Younger's cabinet disintegrated at 'the very height of the hurricane'[56] when Russia as well as France had declared war on Britain, on 14 February 1801 the war office were warned that Russia was planning to invade India through Persia.[57] The Russian army would comprise 50,000 men: 20,000 had already reached Georgia, the others were following, and they were to have cleared the Khyber Pass before the autumn. The ambassador at Vienna did not confirm this information until the middle of April. He knew by then that the tsar had been assassinated and the expedition countermanded. He was not afraid of its resurrection: 'such an enterprise could never have been deemed very formidable'.[58]

The British had been misinformed. The Russian expedition to India were to have marched from Orenburg through Bokhara.[59] The Russians' interest in Georgia was local: it was also permanent. At Vienna the ambassador could be expected to disregard it, because if French imperialism were ever to be checked, the attention of Russia had to be concentrated on western Europe. Without the support of both Britain and Russia, Austria would hesitate to fight: Russian expansion in the near east might encourage her to come to terms with France. The Napoleonic wars could only have been won by France, and were lost, in Persia and Turkey.

Nobody responsible for the defence of British India could view a threatened invasion merely as a tiresome diversion from the search for coalitions. It is often forgotten, particularly by hagiographers of Pitt,[60] how serious was the situation for Britain in the spring of 1801, when the British had no reason to expect the death of Paul and a dramatic change in Russian policy. Dundas remained for a few weeks at the board of control, because Pitt's successor, Henry Addington, had difficulty finding a suitable replacement. His eventual choice, the earl of Dartmouth, was most unsuitable.[61] Early in March the danger from the Russians was compounded by the escape of a French fleet from Brest. The enemy might have been planning a joint attack on the British in the east, at a moment when their only disposable force was committed to a campaign in Egypt, proving slower than Dundas had expected, and

requiring 3,000 troops from India for a diversion in the Red Sea.[62]

Despite their claim to mastery of the seas, the British found it difficult to wage the amphibious warfare their strategy demanded, and looked to allies to fight on their behalf. In 1801 the co-operation of the near eastern states became more vital to Britain than when Bonaparte had invaded Egypt in 1798. Dundas warned Wellesley to keep watch for the French fleet at Mauritius;[63] Jones to be prepared for the mission to Afghanistan he had persistently recommended; and Malcolm to make certain the shah of Persia would fight in Azerbaijan.[64] The near eastern states were to accept their responsibility to subordinate traditional quarrels to the more important interest of helping the British defend India.

Jones and Malcolm, as one would expect, disagreed about the immediate danger from Russia. Malcolm had temporarily the greater influence, because his views suited the new foreign secretary, Lord Hawkesbury, as preoccupied as his predecessor Lord Grenville with improving relations with Russia as the prelude to a coalition. Until Castlereagh succeeded Dartmouth in 1802, no member of the government was capable, as Dundas had been, of arguing the alternative needs of Indian defence. Addington's government in consequence escaped the wrangle about strategy that had paralysed Pitt's, and were successful in negotiating at Amiens terms of peace remarkably satisfactory given Britain's equally remarkable ineptitude during the war of the second coalition.

There was a second reason for Malcolm's temporary pre-eminence. His opinions were seconded by the ambassador at Constantinople, the earl of Elgin. Elgin knew little of the near east himself, although in the Ochakoff debate he had shown acute insight into the effects of Russian expansion into Turkey on the balance of power in Europe,[66] and at first followed Wellesley's advice to disregard any information from Jones.[67] In January 1801, when war with Russia was imminent, Elgin asked Malcolm whether Russia would be capable of attacking Britain in India.[68]

The Russians in Georgia alarmed Malcolm no more than Bonaparte in Egypt had Wellesley. Malcolm replied to Elgin that Russia could neither invade India herself, because she would need between three and five years to move sufficient troops and stores to a forward base, nor would any of the near eastern states fight on her behalf. The Russian empire was bound to expand in Asia, but over hasty expansion would cause more problems than it solved, a comment Malcolm would never have applied to Wellesley and British India. The most threatening lines of expansion would be southwards towards the Tigris, likely to destroy the Ottoman Empire, and eastwards from the Caspian Sea towards Khiva and Bokhara. The least threatening would be towards Persia. As soon as Russia annexed Georgia, Russo-Persian hostility could be assumed: instead of allying with Russia against Britain, 'a rupture between the two states is a much more probable event'.[69] This, to Malcolm, was the key to the security of India. There was no alternative to Persia. The Afghans were already hostile to both Britain and Persia, and too weak to threaten either. Russia could not reinforce them until she had defeated Persia, who would always be able to cut communications with Georgia. The bey of Bokhara as a fanatical Mahometan would cut them in Turkestan.

The near eastern states were not strong enough effectively to resist France or

Russia: they were of no value as allies. 'Asiatic powers' Malcolm warned Wellesley '... were but weak barriers against the approach of European nations.'[70] This weakness, paradoxically, was their strength. Malcolm never changed his mind about this.

> The power of Asiatic countries to resist the invasions of a regular army [he said thirty three years later] depends less upon their riches than their poverty, the want of resources of their country, the unsettled habits of the inhabitants, and their being in fact intangible to the attack of regular force. They yield like a reed to the storm, but are not broken.[71]

As Russia could not defeat, Britain could not control them, and had no need to, or not directly. Here Malcolm followed William Eton. The best defence against Russian expansion into Baghdad, and the best lever on the policy of Persia,[72] would be fortress in the Persian Gulf. Two or three thousand troops at Kishm, naturally under his command, would be 'an obstacle of magnitude to the nearer approach to India of any power whatever'.[73]

Malcolm, said Harford Jones caustically, who challenged Malcolm's entire approach to Anglo-Persian relations, 'had a furious passion for the possession of an island in the gulf'.[74] Whereas Malcolm had praised his island not only as a fortress but as a bazaar, Jones responded that in his hope of reviving British trade, Malcolm underestimated the effects of declining population and deforestation. What would hinder an army would discourage trade.[75] Jones also challenged the utility of a fortress. If the French should invade India, they would march from Alexandretta to Basra, when the navy could blockade the Persian Gulf, and land troops from Bombay at Mohammerah or Bushire. Jones also doubted whether a force at Kharrack or Kishm could do anything to prevent a Russian invasion, because the Russians would march too far north from Astrabad to Herat; nor could the British defend Baghdad. Instead they would frighten the pasha. A British base in the Persian Gulf would threaten Baghdad more nearly than the Russian occupation of Georgia.[76] By surrendering their strategic mobility, supposedly the principal attraction of sea power, the British would create the situation they were trying to prevent.

Jones had not misunderstood Malcolm: knowing that Malcolm had planned his fortress rather as a diplomatic lever than a base. The two men actually disagreed about the likely policies of the near eastern states. Malcolm and his acolytes were confident that Persians and Arabs would prefer Englishmen to Russians;[77] or when they disliked they would fear them. Jones was more realistic. The shah and the pasha of Baghdad, as far as they knew anything of Englishmen, knew of British aggression in India. Similarly, Georgia was only one province of the Safavid empire that the Kajars dreamed of reconquering. Baghdad, Herat, and Bahrein, were all prizes Russia might offer in return for a Persian alliance, and all of which the British must withhold.[78] Jones was the first Englishman to understand, that unless the British could settle the disputes between Persia and Russia, British interests might suffer more from Russo-Persian co-operation than from their enmity. Persia must be enticed by Britain, not threatened. Malcolm's 'proposed island in the gulf' said Jones 'will lead to enormous expense to no purpose'.[79]

Jones soon had an opportunity to implement his ideas. In the spring of 1801, by the time Dundas's warnings to Jones and Malcolm of the possibility of a

Russian invasion of India arrived at Baghdad, Malcolm had left Persia and returned to India. The field was clear for Jones. At first he had been sceptical of the danger of Russian invasion; naturally he now changed his mind. 'It is the best plan that has yet been conceived to embarrass us in India' he said 'and the easiest executed.'[80] The Russians in Georgia might cross the Caspian from Baku to Astrabad, then march to Herat. Although success would depend upon the attitude of the shah of Persia, for 'it would be madness to advance leaving that country in our influence',[81] in exchange for Herat and Kandahar he might cooperate. As a result, if the assassination of Paul did not lead to a change in Russian foreign policy, Jones recommended sending another British embassy to Teheran, with credentials from the king not the East India Company, to persuade the shah to adhere to his British alliance, and to negotiate peace between the allies and Zeman Shah. To persuade the amir to negotiate, he again offered himself as resident at Kabul. Jones's naivety was a variation on Malcolm's: aware that the British would have to satisfy the conflicting interests of their allies, he was confident this could be easily done by an Englishman.

Jones had the advantage over Malcolm of having lived many years in the near east, and of having travelled widely in Persia. During his travels he made the acquaintance of Mirza Bozurg, the ablest man in Persia, who became minister to Abbas Mirza, the shah's second son and prince-governor of Azerbaijan. Jones warned the minister to encourage the shah to resist the blandishments of Russia, and sent his own agent northwards to report on Russian preparations. Otherwise the British would have found it difficult to act in time, because the Caucasus and the Caspian were 'so much out of the way that ... the storm may be brewed and ready to burst without our knowing anything of it'.[82] Finally, Jones warned Wellesley that if he heard of a Russian embassy to Teheran, he too would go, to exorcise Russian influence.[83] Forestalled in Afghanistan by Malcolm's untimely arrival in Persia, his timely departure tantalised Jones with a glimpse of fame.

III

The residency at Baghdad acted less as a buffer between Persia and Turkish Arabia, or European invasion and British India, than between the government of India and the board of control. Twice in his career Jones was offered opportunities of advancement by Dundas, to be twice denied them by Wellesley.[84] Jones had been sent to Baghdad to establish 'a centre of negotiation and intelligence'.[85] Wellesley, who resented any official who claimed to be independent, and the higher his rank the more his independence was resented, protested to Dundas that Jones 'conceives himself to be a more competent judge than me of the measures to be pursued with relation to the court of Persia', an heinous offence indeed, and demanded that all British officials in the near east 'be immediately subjected to my general powers of control'.[86] Wellesley never forgave Jones this impertinence; because of it when at the foreign office he ruined Jones's career.

The attempt of the board of control to maintain their own agency in the near east proved impossible. The residency at Baghdad could not be detached from both the government of India and the foreign office. The reason was the status

of the board. Until 1801, while Dundas was president, the office was powerful, but Dundas's power did not depend upon this office; his successors were not always members of the cabinet. As a personal whim, the residency was bound to be in difficulties as soon as Dundas was not able to support it. The East India Company's agent at Constantinople had warned Jones on his arrival, that 'the Porte should have been properly instructed of as much of ... [the] the mission as was convenient'.[87] The oversight followed from the reason for Jones's appointment; to answer the refusal of the foreign department to undertake the defence of British India. When Jones asked him,[88] the British minister at Constantinople refused to explain to the Porte the purpose of the residency at Baghdad.[89]

Britain and British India were dissimilar states with conflicting interests in the near east. This was revealed by the conduct of British agents. Those representing the foreign department spoke for a state perpetually at peace. Even when at war it was socially coherent, militarily impregnable, and had expected and persuaded others to fight for it. To fight in the near east would be a waste of allied energy. British India, poor, divided, and with vulnerable frontiers, was a state perpetually at war. Anyone responsible for its defence knew that the slightest enemy influence must be counteracted. The pasha of Baghdad's doctor was a Frenchman. The British, who were nearly as fond of doctors as agents as of soldiers, expected them to provide political and strategic prescriptions. The same was expected of Frenchmen. The attempts made by Jones in 1801 to persuade the pasha to exchange his French doctor for an Englishman[90] caused a collision typifying the difficulties faced by the resident at Baghdad.

Because the embassy at Constantinople would not support Jones, the pasha of Baghdad remarked in 1800, that 'I do not mean to affront you, but your whole business here seems to be confined to forwarding a few letters',[91] and paid scant attention whenever Jones touched on politics. Their misunderstanding was aggravated by Malcolm, who on returning from Persia demanded the protocol due representatives of sovereigns, and worthy of Wellesley, who wore his orders to bed. Malcolm attributed his magnificent reception at Baghdad to Jones's 'well-established influence'.[92] In fact persuading the pasha to treat Malcolm as a grandee of Spain, and afterwards aping his pretensions, was one reason why the pasha decided to be rid of Jones. He protested to the Porte, who asked the British ambassador to recall him.

The ambassador, the earl of Elgin, who according to Jones was '*perfectly ignorant* of the national interests',[93] refused to become involved. He claimed, that as Jones was not under his orders, he could neither recall nor support him.[94] Technically this was true. Jones had never been granted the immunities of a consul, and he and Elgin lacked even a common cypher for secret correspondence. Although the evidence is doubtful,[95] there was a less avowable reason for Elgin's inactivity, that casts interesting light upon the conduct of British agents in the Ottoman Empire. The Levant Company had traditionally expected their ambassadors to augment their salaries by the sale of *berats*;[96] conferring upon their purchasers the immunities granted to Englishmen by the capitulations. Elgin may have been anxious to maintain cordial relations with the pasha, to avoid jeopardising those under his protection.[97]

To avoid effort may have been Elgin's principal anxiety. When the Porte hinted that they might recognise Jones as a consul, Elgin did not pursue the matter.[98] His greatest interest was the search for curiosities and works of art.[99] At the height of Jones's quarrel with the pasha, he was asked by Elgin to take steps to recover some shirts Jones had sent him from Baghdad that had been plundered on the way.[100] 'Though a Welshman' said Jones '... I have been able to contain myself under circumstances that would have made Cadwallador run mad.'[101]

Jones eventually decided to signify his displeasure by withdrawing from Baghdad, a standard British practice meant to bring all native rulers who witnessed it rapidly to order. Malcolm, who had been promoted private secretary to the governor-general, was glad of it: 'Our influence' he said 'will ever be more hurt than promoted by any attempts to maintain it in Asia by concession.'[102] The governor of Bombay protested to the pasha, but decided that how permanently to improve the effectiveness of the residency must be left to the East India Company, who after Dundas's retirement thought it an unnecessary expense, or to the government of India, who were suspicious of Jones's political initiatives.[103] From the summer of 1801 Jones was continually seeking an alternative position. If he were to remain at Baghdad, he wanted to be appointed a consul-general responsible directly and only to London.[104]

Jones was dismayed that nobody but Dundas had paid consistent attention to the potential dangers to Britain in the near east. The importance of the residency at Baghdad had depended upon the French occupation of Egypt. In Jones's opinion to evacuate Baghdad when the French evacuated Egypt would be a mistake. If they had landed in 1798 in Syria, they might have marched easily to Basra. Should they try again, they would land at Alexandretta.[105] They might also persuade the Turks to agree. Despite the Anglo-Turkish alliance, as soon as peace was made the French would regain their traditional pre-eminence in the Ottoman Empire.[106] Jones was always impatient with the Turks, but he shared their premise. The French enemy in the near east was temporary, the Russian permanent: the French might be driven out, the Russians only contained. When the tsar was assassinated, and Jones's agent reported all to be quiet on the Caspian,[107] only the immediate threat disappeared. The prospective danger was unaltered. Throughout the winter and spring of 1801–1802, Jones explained to the board of control how Russia threatened Britain in the near east, and what steps must be taken to counter her, if the British chose to maintain their connection with Persia.

Jones was refining the argument he had used in opposition to Malcolm. The 20,000 Russian troops in Georgia, reported bound for India, were instead the beginning of a 'systematic plan of establishment and strength'.[108] If ever Britain quarrelled with Russia in Europe, Georgia would provide a better base than Egypt for an invasion or feint at India.[109] Malcolm's weak and disordered states might be a sufficient barrier to invasion; they could not withstand steady and persistent Russian expansion. Then 'a few years must necessarily produce a revolution in these countries'.[110] The crucial areas to be watched, in which Russia was already showing keen interest, were Erivan and the ports on the Caspian Sea; one the gateway to Azerbaijan, the other to Turkestan.[111] The crucial decision to be taken was how to maintain the Persian connection. There was no alternative to Persia, because Wellesley had successfully

provoked civil war in Afghanistan. One dilemma had in consequence been superseded by another.

According to Jones, the expansion of Russia in the Caucasus, south-eastwards from Georgia into the Mahometan khanates, would soon 'endanger the political independence, if not the safety' of Persia.[112] Either Persia would fight Russia for Georgia and Erivan, or she would come to terms, perhaps even admit to her dependence upon Russia, and with Russian support seek compensation. The outcome might be an attack on Baghdad, assisting Russia, having overawed Persia, to overawe the Ottoman Empire.[113] Whether Persia fought or negotiated, whether Russia preferred to partition Persia and Turkey, or to preserve them as dependent states on her southern frontier, unless the British had prepared an adequate defence, British India would be equally endangered. The best defence would be to forestall the Russians in the areas strategically most important. One was Baghdad. The Porte must be persuaded to recognise the status of the residency, and to consult the British when selecting local officials.[114] Supported by the British, the sultan might be able to reassert his authority over the pasha.

Persia was as important as Baghdad. The shah must be persuaded to receive a resident British ambassador, sent from London not Calcutta, on the assumption that Anglo-Persian relations should be coordinated with Anglo-Russian relations in Europe. Jones's conviction that the two could not be separated, that the defence of British India could not be left to the governor-general, in itself sufficient reason for Wellesley's suspicions of him, determined his conception of the ambassador's duties. In co-operation with the ambassador at Constantinople, and the resident at Baghdad, he was to settle the outstanding quarrels between Persia and Russia and Persia and Turkey.[115] The best method of defending British India against Russian expansion in the Caucasus was to delineate the frontiers between Persia and Turkey in Kurdistan, and Persia and Russia in the Mahometan khanates.

To maintain these settlements, and to prevent Russia's exciting rebellion as a preliminary to demands for altering the frontier, the British should send a military mission to train the Persian army. 'We are now interested' said Jones 'that the present government of Persia should become stable and respectable.'[116] If the British were to maintain their Persian connection, Persia must be rejuvenated; but the frontiers must be delineated first, to avoid antagonising Russia, and causing the danger the policy was intended to prevent. Jones was shrewder than many who followed because he did not confuse stability with order. Persia could be stable while disordered, provided her frontiers were settled.

These steps became more urgent, although the chance of success more difficult to estimate, because Jones expected no co-operation from the Turks. The feud between Turkey and Persia was as longstanding and bitter as that between both of them and Russia. Against European invasion it contributed to India's defence: the assistance of one state along the route would guarantee an enemy the hostility of the next. Unfortunately the quarrel would expose India to the repercussions of Russian expansion. Jones, who had hoped the Turks might fight Russia alongside Persia, had warned '*the sublime but sordid ignorant Porte*', as he called it, that Russia would annex Georgia, unless they bribed the king to seek their protection.[117] The Turks chose to believe, against

all previous experience, that Russia's objectives in the Caucasus were limited. From the situation there they temporarily benefited. Throughout 1802 and 1803 they were pleased to see the Russians advancing along the Caspian, not the Black Sea, and as a result diverting Persia from Baghdad.[118] As late as 1804 they remained unconcerned about Russian activity even in the western Caucasus, because Russia had annexed only territories over which they had renounced their suzerainty.[119] This was true. What offended Jones was the apparent inability or unwillingness of the Turks to remember, that Russia had traditionally attacked Turkey and Persia separately, in order to exploit victory over one against the other.

During his life Jones suffered the persecution of Wellesley, Minto,[120] and Malcolm; after his death Sir John Kaye, Malcolm's idolator, was equally venomous. Jones invited catastrophe. His timing was bad. Wellesley ruined his career by resigning from Perceval's government without explaining why; then permitting the speech he had not made to be published after Perceval's assassination. Jones was caught upon the death of Malcolm with his memoirs nearly finished. As they were critical of his rival, he should not have published them so soon.[121] The strife that perpetually surrounded him should not be permitted to detract from his reputation. In an analysis to be echoed by Lord Ellenborough nearly thirty years later, during the peace of Amiens Jones had accurately predicted the difficulties of defending British India once the Great Game in Asia began.

IV

To support the underdog is a duty amongst the English. In history they support winners. Here is no contradiction: the English always won, and, a double cause of rejoicing, saw themselves as the underdog. Their sequence of Davids teaching necessary lessons to European Goliaths stretched from Drake at bowls, through Chatham winning Canada on the banks of the Elbe, and Palmerston berating Russia as all humbug,[122] to Churchill fighting with rhetoric as a substitute for strategy. Then there were those who failed, men like Newcastle, Wellesley, and Halifax, who understood that more than strong words was necessary to win wars. The most maligned administration is Addington's. It is at least arguable that in negotiating the peace of Amiens, and two years later denouncing it, Addington and Hawkesbury were demonstrating an awareness of the balance of power in Europe more acute than that of their vaunted predecessors, Pitt and Grenville. The result was apparent in the near east, in the use they made of the residency at Baghdad.

At a time when the government of India were planning strategy for the defence of British India, Jones was advocating an alternative to the secret committee and the board of control. They were impressed by his detailed analysis,[123] but were interested primarily in Afghanistan, because they realised that British policy in the near east must not appear to be based upon suspicion of Russia.[124] Hawkesbury's most urgent need in 1801 was to re-establish amicable relations with the tsar,[125] as the best way to obtain better terms of peace from France, and to oblige Bonaparte to abide by them. This affected British policy everywhere east from Malta. The British agreed to evacuate Malta, because it was more suitable to be an outwork in the defence of India

than a naval base in the western Mediterranean.[126] Provided the island was not French, and Russia would guarantee its independence, to whom it belonged hardly mattered.[127] Malta became a touchstone of Anglo-Russian co-operation. Early in 1803 the British decided that, despite the terms of the treaty of Amiens, they would not evacuate.[128] Their reason was a change in the attitude of Russia. Prince Czartoriski had told the British ambassador 'that the Emperor wished the British to keep Malta'.[129]

This preference for co-operating with Russia was not a choice between Britain's European and imperial interests, between the balance of power on the continent and the defence of British India. As had Dundas and the secret committee, Addington and Hawkesbury saw France as the more immediate threat to India, and, unlike Grenville, hoped for Russian co-operation in the near east as well as western Europe. It might not win the war; it might be a necessary preliminary to fighting the decisive battle. These priorities were made explicit during 1802, after Castlereagh had replaced Dartmouth at the board of control, in a discussion of the future of the Ottoman Empire.

Castlereagh and Addington seemed 'impressed' Jones was told 'with *some* sense of the impending danger to our Indian interests from the Russian movements' in the Caucasus.[130] This was the opinion of Lieutenant-Colonel Harcourt, who had been sent home from India overland with despatches. On the way he had stayed with Jones at Baghdad, and agreed to relay his opinions. Addington respected Harcourt: he had never met 'a more zealous and honourable man'.[131] He also respected the thoroughness of Jones, and asked him to continue his enquiries in the Caucasus. Harcourt concluded that Addington and Castlereagh were thinking of appointing a resident envoy at Teheran, but would 'require some further spur', and urged Jones to continue pressing.[132]

Their different priorities were revealed early in September. Addington asked for Jones's opinions of the probable effects on British interests of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Four questions were posed: whether, if the Turks were driven from Europe, they could become an Asiatic power; whether Egypt should be restored to the Mamelukes, or given to the Russians or another European state; whether Baghdad should be given to Persia or declared independent; and, underlying all the others, how were the French to be kept out of Egypt and Syria.[133] These questions were testimony to the continuing influence of Dundas, or, if they were not, were a sign that the interests of states survive changes in government. Addington and Castlereagh were implying, as had Dundas during the first coalition, that Britain's most vital interest in the near east was to persuade everyone to ignore it.

The possibility of French expansion in the near east was most alarming to the British, who were counting upon Russia to help them resist. Their embarrassments were a sufficient warning to Palmerston and Gladstone. By the terms of the treaty of Amiens the British were to evacuate Egypt. The Russians and Turks had permitted them to remain only until the end of the war.[134] The tsar did not want the British in the near east; he wanted them to keep out the French. The sultan wanted them to keep out the Mamelukes, to restore his authority in Egypt. Before the British evacuated, they had to discover a compromise between the beys and the sultan, that would in emergencies permit British intervention in Egypt but forbid French.

Unfortunately, to detach the beys from the French, the commander-in-chief, Egypt, had promised to restore their régime. This offended the sultan, and caused a quarrel between the soldiers in Egypt supporting the beys, and the ambassador at Constantinople, who supported the sultan.[135] To the soldiers the choice might be difficult but obvious. If Britain supported the sultan, the Egyptians 'would consider *any* invading power only as a fortunate and welcome means of delivery', whereas support of the beys would provide 'an efficient barrier ... against at least the *immediate* enterprises of the French'.[136]

The British could not coerce the Turks, who had been put in possession of every fortified position.[137] Nor could they coerce the beys. There was every chance of civil war in Egypt, and General Sébastiani's mission implied an equal chance of French intervention. This French threat saved the residency at Baghdad. In September 1801 Dundas's confidant, David Scott, resigned six months early the chairmanship of the East India Company. His successors 'were not so sensible as they ought to have been' Jones was warned 'to the utility' of the residency.[138] The war scare of October 1802, and the deteriorating relations with France that followed, postponed their demand to abolish it. Jones, however, refused to confine his activities to the French, or to the immediate danger, as he showed by his answers to Addington's questions.

Jones was uninterested in the Ottoman territories in Europe, and doubted whether their loss would undermine the authority of the sultan. The loss of Mecca and Medina might, because his spiritual was as important as political and military power. Jones was one in a long time of Englishmen who believed that the Ottoman Empire could survive as a sufficiently powerful state to suit the British in Anatolia, Syria, and Arabia. Egypt was as peripheral as the Balkans. Britain did not need control of Egypt: her only interests there, preventing an invasion of India, could be protected either by a naval base or by patrolling the Red Sea. The beys would not be able to control Egypt; they would gradually succumb to French influence. The solution was not to restore the authority of the sultan, who would prove as incapable as the beys of preserving it, but to turn Egypt into a protectorate of another European state.

The dangerous repercussions of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire would be farther east, in Persia, Armenia, and Baghdad. If the French occupied Syria, they would easily march an army of 20,000 to India. If the shah could march a Persian army from Teheran to Meshed and back during the summer, the French might cross Persia and Afghanistan quickly enough to escape the rigours of winter in the mountains, and arrive in the plains of the Punjab in time for the winter campaigning season. The achievements of Alexander ought not to prove beyond Bonaparte. Nor did Jones discount the possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance. While the French occupied Syria, the Russians might Armenia. As a defence Jones summoned himself to greatness. To prevent the approach of an European army from inciting rebellion, it was important 'to fight for India out of India'. The best place to fight both the French and the Russians was Baghdad, the obvious man to co-ordinate the defence of India the resident at Baghdad: 'If the passage of the Euphrates had been properly guarded Darius might have been saved.'[139]

Britain needed a resident ambassador at Teheran, to hold the shah to his British alliance, and a military mission at Baghdad, supported when necessary by British troops. Jones opposed permitting Persia to annex Baghdad; he

preferred a British protectorate. To support his authority over the pasha, he asked for discretionary power to summon from India 1,000 infantry and six field guns. This force would be strong enough to quell all local disturbances, including the Wahabi. Without it Baghdad would become so disordered as to invite foreign intervention. In the spring of 1802 the Wahabi, already in control of the Hedjaz, had looted and destroyed a Shi-ite shrine at Meshed Hosein. The pasha had failed to prevent the outrage and would again. 'The government of Baghdad' Jones told Wellesley '... cannot ... act with any effect against these sectaries, and indeed I now begin to doubt unless some proper arrangements are made, whether it can long support itself against them.'[140] To defeat the French, should they invade Syria, 5,000 British infantry would be needed. Jones assumed that provided the British retained Malta, the navy should be able to intercept the French: provided the British were in control of Persia and Baghdad it would not matter if the navy failed. Odds of four to one need not seem unfair. Dundas had sent Jones to Baghdad to defeat Bonaparte, and had expected him to manage single handed.

Jones saw the Russians in the Ionian Islands, the Crimea, and the Caucasus, was alarmed about the disintegration of Asiatic Turkey, and planned to defend British India in Persia and Baghdad.[141] Addington and Castlereagh saw the French in Dalmatia, Constantinople, and Egypt, and planned to forestall them from a naval base at Malta, because they feared the effects of the disintegration of European Turkey upon the balance of power in Europe. In April 1803 Sir Hugh Inglis, editing Jones's replies to Addington's questions, stressed the danger from France more than Russia.[142] The result was as Inglis had planned: Castlereagh asked Jones to write privately as he had previously written to Dundas.[143] Castlereagh also warned the pasha that Sebastiani had advocated the occupation of Baghdad as well as Egypt.[144] Jones would remain at his post for the reason he had been sent, to oppose French influence in the Levant.

At a time when the British were preparing to renew the war, they had to be careful not to offend Russia. They could risk war because, although the Russians had refused a coalition, and also a more limited agreement 'to provide for the security and integrity of the Turkish dominions',[145] on the grounds that it would provoke before the Austrians were ready the general European war it was designed to prevent, they had promised to co-operate with Britain against France in the near east, and had agreed to permit Britain to retain Malta.[146] If France could only have won the Napoleonic wars by fighting in the near east, her enemies could only have lost. Whatever the future danger to British India, the survival of both states appeared to depend upon Anglo-Russian co-operation east of Malta.

There was a domestic, as well as this foreign, reason for not extending the scope of the residency at Baghdad. It had become entangled in politics at East India House. When Jones realised this, he asked Inglis to obtain him instead a seat in council at Bombay.[147] Inglis dared not try, because to save the residency he had been arguing how important was the function Jones fulfilled at Baghdad.[148] His friend James Willis added that Jones need not worry. As Long as Addington and Castlereagh were convinced that the French might invade Egypt or Syria, they would not close the residency.[149] Willis was right, but the argument was bitter, because the residency became a pawn in the more venomous quarrel between Wellesley and the shipping interest.

By the time Henry Dundas resigned the board of control in 1801, he and the chairman David Scott at London, and Lord Wellesley at Calcutta, had offended a majority of the directors by permitting privately owned shipping to trade with India. When Dundas's successor, Lord Dartmouth, continued his policy and his dependence on Scott, the directors forced him to resign. Addington gave Dartmouth little support, because he needed the votes of the company in parliament. In April 1802 the shipping interest, the group most threatened by private trading, 'gained complete charge of the direction' and elected their nominees, headed by Sir Jacob Bosanquet 'the most powerful man in the court', chairmen.[150] Simultaneously Scott, who had resigned as chairman in September 1801, resigned from the direction. His associates were immediately proscribed. In 1804 Willis also resigned, because he was 'so unjustly treated ... by Mr Scott's enemies'.[151] As a connection of Dundas and Scott, Jones could expect similar treatment.

As chairman in 1798 Bosanquet had been persuaded by Dundas to send Jones to Baghdad 'without the immediate sanction of the court of directors'.[152] He had understood the appointment to be temporary, and had agreed only because he correctly guessed that, if the French were not forestalled in the near east, Wellesley would seize the opportunity to disguise aggression as defence against invasion.[153] In 1804, arguing that the resident at Basra could substitute, Bosanquet tried to recall Jones, or to provoke him to resign by drastically reducing his salary.[154] The manoeuvre failed because Castlereagh, increasingly influenced by Dundas, would not agree.[155] As long as disturbances in the Ottoman Empire provided an opportunity for French intervention, the residency at Baghdad was both the best source of information and the best means of counter-action. In July Pitt and Dundas returned to office. Scott told Jones that as a result he hoped once again to support his friends.[156] The residency at Baghdad was saved.

The friends of Jones had exerted their influence to preserve his appointment: they could not enlarge it. The danger from France did not appear to require it, that from Russia could not be permitted to. At Constantinople the ambassador, the earl of Elgin, had seen the two to be entwined. On his return journey to India, Colonel Harcourt had persuaded Elgin to disregard Wellesley's advice, and to pay attention to Jones. This was reflected in Elgin's increasing interest in Persia. Like Addington and Castlereagh, Elgin saw France in Syria, Egypt, and the Balkans, as the most direct threat to Britain. The best defence would be the permanent retention of Malta. From Malta the British could prevent the partition of the Ottoman Empire, and any enemy action likely to threaten British India. In particular they could prevent the French from reoccupying Egypt. They might 'either interpose a great degree of influence; or ... carry on vigorous operations; or ... be at liberty to remain a passive observer of the affairs of the Levant'.[157]

To strengthen British influence in the peripheral and most disordered provinces of the Ottoman Empire, in the autumn of 1802 Elgin persuaded the Porte to recognise Jones and the British agent at Bucharest as consuls.[158] The result might restrain Russia as well as France. Elgin had realised how, if only indirectly, Russia might disturb British India: if the British disregarded her expansion in the Caucasus, the shah of Persia would appeal for support to France. Co-operation against France during the war depended upon the same

principle as the Holy Alliance after it, the preservation of the integrity of Turkey and Persia. As he was about to return home, Elgin told Jones that he would hasten his departure, to warn the government of 'the increasing interest we daily acquire in the eastern provinces of Turkey and Persia'.[159] Unfortunately Elgin, who was easily diverted from politics to art, was caught travelling through France at the outbreak of war and imprisoned.

Jones had perceived a second connection between Britain's European and Indian interests. The Ottoman Empire might be destroyed not by French intervention in Egypt and the Balkans, but in Arabia by the Wahabi. By 1801 the Wahabi, who had already overpowered the sherif of Mecca, were threatening Baghdad. The Turks talked of combined operations from Syria, Baghdad and Mecca,[160] but Jones doubted whether Baghdad, a government of 'knaves, fools, and liars,'[161] would attempt or prove capable of taking part. Unless some action were taken, the shah of Persia might be encouraged to 'preach up a kind of religious crusade' to regain control of Nejef and Kerbela, the Shi-ite shrines in Baghdad, and 'thousands of enthusiastic soldiers would flock to his standard'.[162]

After the destruction of Meshed Hosein in the spring of 1802 this became increasingly likely.[163] The ulema in Persia demanded an immediate attack on the Wahabi, and were over-ruled only because the shah's ministers preferred first to complete the pacification of Khorassan.[164] The danger to Britain was twofold. The Russians might encourage the shah, as a method of finding him compensation for Georgia, and any Persian crusade in the desert was likely to lead to disaster, and in consequence to farther Russian advances in the Caucasus. If the Persians marched through Basra, as the Fourth Crusade on their way to the Holy Land, they would undoubtedly first sack Baghdad.[165]

Harford Jones immediately demonstrated the utility of his residency by mediating between Persia and Baghdad, and arranging that any Persian expedition should travel through Bahrein.[166] Jones also hoped to persuade the Porte to send an ambassador to Teheran, to take this opportunity to improve the chances of their co-operating in the Caucasus.[167] The Turks, however, preferred to rely upon Russian advances towards Erivan to restrain the Persians on their behalf.[168] Despite this, Jones succeeded in one of his objects, to make himself 'the medium of communication between the king of Persia and the pasha'.[169]

The attraction of threats to the bold is in providing opportunities. Early in August 1802 the pasha of Baghdad died. Jones firstly argued that only the appointment of the grand vizier, and the arrival of a Turkish army, could preserve the Ottoman Empire in Arabia. Then he changed his mind and successfully argued for the nomination of one of the local officials.[170] His purpose was to turn the pasha into a client. 'The Company and the British ambassador at Constantinople' he explained to Elgin 'have the reputation throughout all this country of being able to make the pasha of Baghdad.'[171]

> Might we not go so far, if compelled to it [said Jones], as to tell the Porte, after the services we have rendered her, that considering the good connexion there is between the pashalic of Baghdad and India, we insist on no person being appointed to it but such as shall be agreeable to us. ... it is better for us to bully the Porte into her own interests than to let others bully her out of it, and hurt us into the bargain.[172]

Jones had started his campaign to turn Baghdad into a protectorate.

According to Jones Baghdad stood at the junction of the most important routes to the east. Whether the French advanced eastwards from Syria, or the Russians south-eastwards from Georgia, 'India one day or other will be fought for on the banks of the Tigris or Euphrates; and the victory most probably will rest with the enemy or us, according as this government shall be managed by us in the interim'.[172] The standard Indian method of managing protectorates was the subsidiary alliance. The pasha often asked for a British military mission, but always withdrew his request.[173] In 1804 Jones wanted him to be offered British troops, because of the 'advantage it would be to us to have in these times such a force free of expense stationed at Basra'.[174]

There was no alternative to British intervention; at least the government of India must be recognised as having an equal interest at Baghdad as the Russians had obtained in the Principalities. As long as the Wahabi continued to 'strike at the very essence of the Ottoman constitution', Baghdad would be disordered and the Persians likely to invade.[175]

> There is nothing can save this country to the Turks [Jones warned the company's agent at Constantinople] but the most cordial union between the Honourable Company and this pashalic and so the ministry at Constantinople should be told. As to the pasha's marching to Dereya [against the Wahabi], it may do well enough to amuse the mob at Constantinople, but to those who know anything about the matter it is all my eye Betty Martin.[176]

Whether to defend India from the effects of the continued expansion of Russia, or the balance of power from the effects of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire, the British should occupy Baghdad.

The concern shown by Elgin and Jones was justified. The renewal of war in Europe coincided with a change in Russian policy in the Caucasus. During 1803 the Russians struck south from Georgia into the Mahometan khanates, and in 1804 besieged Erivan. This was particularly dangerous to the Kajars, because their tribal support came from Azerbaijan and Mazenderan. The Russian offensive was also peculiarly irritating. Had the shah not had to divert this attention from Khorassan, he might have captured Herat. Persia could not expand eastwards, nor south-westwards into Kurdistan and Baghdad, until she had come to terms with Russia.[177] The British were interested in the war because it might divert Russia from Europe. From St. Petersburg the British ambassador reported in the winter of 1803, that the Russians would continue to support Britain's resistance to French attempts to partition the Ottoman Empire, and might shortly be willing to negotiate an alliance with Austria as the prelude to a third coalition.[178] During 1804 Prince Czartoriski, who was responsible for Russian policy in Asia, added the assurance that Russia would not advance beyond Erivan, nor threaten the integrity of Persia.[179] Harford Jones disagreed: 'The progress the Russians are making on the shores of the Caspian appears a matter of more real alarm than the preparations the French are making on the shores of the Channel'.[180] The British Government, however, was obliged to be satisfied. The prerequisite for a coalition was being met. They would not be forced to choose between their European and Indian interests.

The British government placed a third coalition ahead of Jones's plans for the security of India. The government of India preferred to obtain influence in Persia than Baghdad. In 1801 Wellesley forbad Jones to visit Persia, even if Russia should be planning an invasion;[181] thereafter he studiously ignored him. The result was unfortunate for Jones. As Malcolm and Wellesley claimed in India, in relations with Asiatic states unless one went forwards one went backwards, because they could not be relied upon rationally to calculate their own interest.[182] From 1804, principally as a result of the intrigues of Samuel Manesty when returning from Persia, Jones's influence at Baghdad sharply declined.[183] During 1805 he lived in virtual confinement, until in the autumn the ambassador at Constantinople recommended him to leave, because the Porte would not guarantee his safety.[184] Instead of the British resident's making the pasha, he had unmade the resident.

'It is very easy to propose to take pashalics and provinces under our protection' said the president of the board of control thirty years later to the resident at Baghdad, who had been recommending annexation, 'but it is not so easy to change a whole course of policy.[185] The British were committed to the war against France. If they could persuade Russia to fight, they could ignore the potential danger to India from Russian expansion in the Caucasus. To concentrate upon the defence of British India might have caused a quarrel with Russia in the near east, the prerequisite of French hegemony in Europe. While a coalition in Europe depended on agreement to preserve the integrity of Turkey and Persia, demanding too visible influence there would provoke the danger the suggestion was intended to avert.

Jones's analysis was untimely, but it was correct. The British were committed to a policy but the policy was wrong. They did not appear to be choosing between India and Europe, because co-operating with Russia defended British India against France; but, while the British were restrained in the near east, the Russians advanced. During the Napoleonic wars there was no danger, although there was no reason to expect none. Until the Russians captured Erivan and Nakitchevan, controlling the passes from Caucasus into Azerbaijan, Persia might fight. When they were lost she would have to come to terms. Jones had debated all the possibilities. The British must forestall the Russians in Persia, ally with Afghanistan, or declare a protectorate over Baghdad. To ignore all of them would eventually hazard the security of India, and compel the British to fall back on the fourth and least satisfactory possibility, a fortress in the Persian Gulf.

Bureaucracies never forget; or perhaps they never think anything new. During his residence at Baghdad Jones had debated the possible methods of defending British India, and his analysis would be repeated twenty-five years later at the beginning of the Great Game in Asia. The arguments usually attributed to Wellesley and Malcolm had been stated more coherently by Jones. There was one startling omission. He made no mention of trade, except to discourage Malcolm's hopes of reviving it. Trade would justify residencies neither at Basra nor Baghdad.[186] A resident was needed at Basra to supervise the post, a second at Baghdad to co-ordinate strategy and defence. In the near east trade had been superseded by empire. Not until Ellenborough seized on the strategic potential of cotton goods would the British be interested in trade. Then they would be interested in using it. Gallagher and Robinson must be

turned around;[187] the imperialism of free trade be redefined as free trade for imperialism. For the government of India diplomacy was not an extension of trade; trade was an arm of strategy and diplomacy. This is hardly surprising. British historians too often write as if all states were wealthy and secure. British India, which was not, needed guns more than butter.

NOTES

1. Ellis to Grant, private, 13 September 1833, I.O. FR/Persia/48.
2. Willis to Jones, 28 August 1798, National Library of Wales, Kentchurch Court MSS 6180; hereinafter K.C. MSS.
3. H. Nicolson, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919–1925* London, 1934, pp. 88–89, 193–95.
4. See H. Kissinger, *A World Restored* Universal Library Edition: New York, 1964, pp. 265–66.
5. Sir L. Woodward, *Great Britain and the German Navy* London, 1935, pp. 68, 93, 100.
6. See above, Part I, pp. 279.
7. Levant Company to Smith, 5 March, 29 October 1799, S.P. 105/122.
8. A. C. Wood, *A History of the Levant Company* London, 1935, pp. 183–84.
9. E. Ingram, 'A Preview of the Great Game in Asia – II: The Proposal of an Alliance with Afghanistan, 1798–1800', *Middle Eastern Studies*, ix (1973), 159–63. See also E. Ingram, 'The Defence of British India – I: The Invasion Scare of 1798', *Journal of Indian History*, xlviii (1970), 565–81.
10. He was allowed his expenses, and paid £3,125 a year. 10/L/PS/Misc/1, p. 13. Sir Robert Liston at Constantinople had been paid £2,000, and Lord Elgin was paid only £4,000. John Barker at Aleppo was paid £1,200 by the Levant Company and £100 for forwarding the overland despatches for the East India Company.
11. The route through Egypt and the Red Sea was known as the 'overland' route, and that through Constantinople and Basra as a 'direct' route.
12. H. Furber, 'The Overland Route to India in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries', *Journal of Indian History*, xxix (1951), 105–21.
13. Compare Furber, *ibid.*, p. 122.
14. A. Amin, *British Interests in the Persian Gulf* Leiden, 1967, pp. 57–67.
15. H. L. Hoskins, *British Routes to India* London, 1928, pp. 4, 21.
16. Court of directors to governor of Bombay, 17 December 1792, I.O. Despatches to Bombay/2.
17. La Touche and Abraham to court of directors, 10 April 1777, I.O. G/29/17.
18. Court of directors to governor-general in council, 4 July 1799, I.O. G/17/5.
19. 'Paper Prepared by Lord Mulgrave for the Use of Mr Dundas', [April 1785], Chatham MSS, Public Record Office, 30/8/360, f. 338.
20. M. E. Yapp, 'The Establishment of the East India Company Residency at Baghdad, 1798–1806', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, vii (1959–60), 324–25.
21. Inglis was one of the chairmen of the East India Company in 1796, 1797, 1799, and 1800.
22. From 1785 to 1804 Willis was chief assistant examiner to East India House.
23. One of Bombay's quarrels with Manesty was his habit of chartering his own boats to the Company to carry mails.
24. Jones to Chairmen of East India Company, 13 April 1796, enclosed in Harley to Dundas, 21 April 1796, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 19.
25. Eton suggested that packets might reach Basra in 53 days by an alternative route through Naples, Latakhia, Aleppo, and Baghdad.
26. Using banking houses as agents was costing the company £200 a packet in commissions.
27. 'Precis [by William Eton] of Mr Jones's Plan for Transmitting Despatches to and from India, and Observations on it', Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 31.
28. 'Secret Observations by Eton', 17 May 1796, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 33.
29. See above, Part I, pp. 8–9.
30. Memorandum by Jones, 28 March 1805, I.O. Bombay SPC/382/6, p. 2009.
31. Jones to court of directors, 13 July 1799, I.O. G/29/23.
32. Statement of Income and Expenditure on the Monthly Packet Service, 17 March 1801, I.O. L/MAR/C/571.

33. Extract from general letter to Bombay, 21 October 1801, I.O. E/4/1017, p.47.

34. Court of directors to governor in council at Bombay, public department, 1 February 1804, I.O. E/4/1019, p. 149.

35. Scott to Duncan, 15 June 1801, Royal Historical Society: *The Correspondence of David Scott ... relating to Indian Affairs 1787–1805*, ed. C. H. Philips, London, 1951, i. 126.

36. Wellesley's secret and confidential letters, in which he libelled his subordinates, were sent by sea. His relations with the East India Company were not improved when one was captured by a French privateer and printed in a Paris newspaper.

37. Their quarrels are described in detail in Yapp, 'Residency at Baghdad', pp. 324–25, 330–32.

38. Jones to Duncan, 15 February 1805, I.O. Bombay SPC/382/6, p. 2002.

39. Jones to Duncan, 31 August 1805, I.O. Bombay SPC/382/9, p. 4158.

40. Ingram, 'Preview of the Great Game in Asia – II', pp. 157–71.

41. Jones to Willis, 8 September 1799, K.C. MSS 9212.

42. Malcolm to Manesty, private and confidential, 19 February 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 211.

43. Manesty to Smith, 12 December 1798, I.O. Bombay SPC/380/75, p. 291.

44. Manesty to Malcolm, private, 7 March 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 215.

45. Jones to Tooke, 26 April 1799, K.C. MSS 9211.

46. Malcolm to Wellesley, 16 February 1800, I.O. G/29/22, p. 53. Compare R. K. Ramazani, *The Foreign Policy of Iran, 1500–1914* Charlottesville, 1966, p. 0, who cannot believe that the British might have preferred to keep Persia weak.

47. Malcolm to Manesty, private and confidential, 28 March 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 223.

48. E. Ingram, 'The Defence of British India – III: Wellesley's Provocation of the Fourth Mysore War', *Journal of Indian History*, Golden Jubilee Volume 1973, 595–622.

49. Wellesley's taste for flattery was apparent before he left Ireland to seek his fortune at London, as the Grenvilles, to whom he first attached himself, had noticed. Grenville to Temple, 27 March 1783, W. M. Torrens, *The Marquess Wellesley: Architect of Empire* London, 1800, p. 46.

50. Malcolm to Manesty, private and confidential, 28 March 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 223.

51. Manesty to Malcolm, confidential, 24 April 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 255.

52. When the governor of Bombay appointed Mehdi Ali Khan British resident at Bushire in 1798, and sent him to Teheran to persuade the shah of Persia to divert Zeman Shah, Wellesley would have preferred him to employ Manesty. Wellesley to Duncan, 24 October 1798, *The Despatches, Minutes, and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G., during his Administration in India*, ed. M. Martin, London, 1836–37, i. 306.

53. For relations between Georgia and Russia, see D. M. Lang, *The Last Years of the Georgian Monarchy, 1658–1832* New York, 1957, pp. 229–46.

54. The text of the treaty is printed in J. C. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East: A Documentary Record* Princeton, 1956, i. 68.

55. For his attempts to obtain support, see E. Ingram 'An Aspiring Buffer State: Anglo–Persian Relations in the Third Coalition, 1804–1807', *Historical Journal*, xvi (1973), 512–22.

56. Auckland to Minto, 10 October 1803, National Library of Scotland, Minto MSS M/70. Auckland, disgusted at Canning's adulation of Pitt, added that 'The "*Storm* was *not* then *weathered*" '.

57. King to Huskisson, secret, 14 February 1801, with enclosure, W.O. 1/771, f. 593.

58. Minto to Hawkesbury, 15 April 1801, *Life and Letters of Sir Gilbert Elliot, First Earl of Minto, from 1751 to 1806*, ed. countess of Minto, London, 1874, iii. 217.

59. See J. L. Schneidmann, 'The Proposed Invasion of India by Russia and France in 1801', *Journal of Indian History*, xxxv (1957), 167–77.

60. Of whom the most famous was Holland Rose.

61. Dartmouth, at the time Viscount Lewisham, had held only household office. Because the East India Company were increasingly difficult to manage, the board of control required political skills second only to the treasury. Dartmouth had shortly to be replace by Castlereagh. See C. H. Philips, *The East India Company, 1784–1834* revised edition: Manchester, 1961, pp. 112–16.

62. For the Egyptian Expedition, see A. B. Roger, *The War of the Second Coalition, 1798–1801: A Strategic Commentary* (Oxford, 1964), pp. 249–74; and E. Ingram, 'A Preview of the Great Game in Asia – III: The Origins of the British Expedition to Egypt in 1801', *Middle Eastern Studies*, ix (1973), 305–10.

63. Secret committee to governor-general in council, 7 March 1801, I.O. L/PS/5/538.

64. Jones to Willis, 17 May 1801, India Office Library, Film. MSS 742; minute of the secret committee, 18 March 1801, I.O. L/PS/1/9.

65. Addington's success depended upon the support of Pitt, who saw him as the only way to escape from Grenville and Dundas. They opposed the peace, one as threatening the balance of power in Europe, the other the security of India.

66. See A. Cunningham, 'The Oczakov Debate', *Middle Eastern Studies*, i (1964–65), 232.

67. Elgin to Dundas, private, 12 March 1800, W.O. 1/344, p. 183.

68. Elgin to Malcolm, 27 January 1801, I.O. G/29/22, p. 519. At his departure for Constantinople, Elgin had been warned by Dundas to keep watch for forward Russian policies in the Caucasus that might endanger British India.

69. Enclosure by Malcolm, 23 March 1801, in Elgin to Hawkesbury, 23 May 1801, F.O. 78/32.

70. Malcolm to Kirkpatrick, 5 May 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 244.

71. 'Notes [by John Malcolm] on the Invasion of India by Russia', in Malcolm to Ellenborough, private, 1 July 1800, Colchester MSS, P.R.O. 30/9/4 pt. 5/7.

72. 'My plan of a settlement in the Gulf is more necessary' added Malcolm '... to keep our present *friend* in check. He may look towards India.' Malcolm to Kirkpatrick, 4 June 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 281.

73. Malcolm to Wellesley, 26 February 1800, I.O. G/29/22, p. 53.

74. Sir H. Jones Brydges, *An Account of the Transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia in the Years 1807–11* London, 1834, i. 138.

75. Jones to Malcolm, 10 October 1800, K.C. MSS 8381.

76. Jones to Willis, 29 November 1800, K.C. MSS 9213.

77. See, for example, minute of Malcolm, 23 March 1828, I.O. Bombay SC/67, 9 April 1828, no. 4; and memorandum by Ellis, 20 May 1835, F.O. 60/37.

78. Jones to Willis, 17 May 1801, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742. This collection is particularly important, being the letters from Jones that Willis forwarded to Henry Dundas.

79. Jones to Griffith, 17 July 1801, K.C. MSS 9213. The 'scheme, I am afraid,' remarked Griffith, who had been provisionally appointed successor to the governor of Bombay, 'will be carried into execution, as Lord Wellesley does not much mind expense.' Griffith to Jones, 28 April 1801, K.C. MSS 6218. This was true; but Wellesley also preferred forward policies.

80. Jones to Willis, 17 May 1801, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

81. *Ibid.*

82. Jones to Inglis, 17 May 1801, I.O. SLV/6. Jones warned the government of India that the embassies at Constantinople and Teheran were very ill informed. Jones to Malcolm, private, 27 September 1802, K.C. MSS 9214.

83. Jones to Wellesley, 14 May 1801, I.O. G/29/23, appendix no. 213.

84. In 1807 Wellesley tried to prevent Jones's being appointed envoy to Persia. Wellesley to Canning, 10 June 1807, Leeds Public Library, Canning MSS 34. Three years later, when Wellesley was foreign secretary, he recalled him.

85. Dundas to Wellesley, private no. 11, 23 March 1799, *Two Views of British India: The Private Correspondence of Mr Dundas and Lord Wellesley, 1798—1801*, ed. E. Ingram, Bath, 1970, p. 141.

86. Wellesley to Dundas, private no. 20, 29 November 1799, *ibid.*, pp. 211–12.

87. Tooke to Jones, 15 November 1798, K.C. MSS 6162.

88. Enclosure by Jones, 24 August 1798, in Huskisson to Canning, 12 October 1798, F.O. 78/20; Jones to Smith, 25 October 1798, K.C. MSS 9211.

89. Smith to Grenville, 28 August 1798, F.O. 78/19; same to same, private, 25 March 1799, Historical Manuscripts Commission: *The Manuscripts of J. B. Fortescue, Esq., Preserved at Dropmore* (London, 1892–1927), iv. 507.

90. Jones to Duncan, 16 June 1801, same to Willis, 22 June 1801, K.C. MSS 9213.

91. Jones to Elgin, private, 20 April 1800, Wellesley MSS, Add. MSS 13707, f. 350.

92. Malcolm to Wellesley, 11 April 1801, I.O. G/29/22, p. 549.

93. Jones to Willis, 19 February 1802, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

94. Enclosure to Jones, 3 August 1801, in Elgin to Hawkesbury, 20 August 1801, F.O. 78/32. Elgin refused to intervene, although he admitted that Jones's difficulties with the pasha of Baghdad, 'have been either devised or formulated by French interest'.

95. S. Ghorbal, *The Beginnings of the Egyptian Question and the Rise of Mehemet Ali* London, 1928, appendix.

96. Sir Robert Ainslie had refused.

97. Jones claimed that he had advised Elgin not to sell *berats*, 'but as he took it into his head to sell them, he ought to take it into his hand to support them'. One according to Jones fetched 7,500 piastres. Jones to Willis, 19 January 1802. I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

98. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 5 September 1801, F.O. 78/32.

99. The moment he arrived at Constantinople, Elgin wrote to Jones that he was 'desirous to get an assortment of very fine India stuffs, particularly muslins and long cloths; perhaps also some good pearls and precious stones may be procured easily from Basra. I am likewise in search of the very best species of Arabian and Persian horses, and of Persian carpets. I should also be tempted to enquire whether the wine of Shiraz is so good as I have heard, and whether it is to be had?' Elgin to Jones, private, 16 November 1799, K.C. MSS 5981. Marbles, apparently, were not Elgin's only interest.

100. Jones to Willis, 17 September 1801, I.O.L. Film, MSS 742.

101. Jones to Willis, 1 July 1801, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

102. Malcolm to Jones, 17 October 1801, K.C. MSS 6532.

103. Duncan to Jones, 23 June 1801, K.C. MSS 6316; governor in council at Bombay to secret committee, 14 February 1802, I.O. L/PS/5/321, p. 471.

104. Jones to Willlis, 24 September 1801, K.C. MSS 9213.

105. Jones to Willis, 12 March, 18 August 1801, K.C. MSS 9213.

106. Jones to Willis, 6 April 1801, Jones to Bosanquet, 30 November 1801, K.C. MSS 9213. 'I saw some time ago this project treated in one of the newspapers as a chimera;' observed Jones 'and I remember the gentleman ... seemed to know very little of the real state of the case.'

107. Jones to Willis, 23 July 1801, K.C. MSS 9213.

108. Jones to Scott, 20 October 1801, I.O. SLV/6.

109. 'Georgia, ... in the event of any future disagreement between us and the court of Petersburg is a more formidable *point d'appui* in respect to our possessions in India, than Egypt would have been in the hands of the French.' Jones to Bosanquet, 30 November 1801, K.C. MSS 9213.

110. Jones to Willis, 19 January 1802, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742. Russia's intervention in the appointment of the patriarch of Echmiadzin 'is one conducted on a system, and on such a system as will lead all the Armenians to acknowledge that power as their protector'.

111. Jones to Dundas, 20 January 1802, with enclosures, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 109. 'There is no doubt' warned Jones 'but the Russians mean to possess themselves of every port in the Caspian on both sides, and depend on it they are laying a foundation in these parts on which they mean to build a very fine house, which will be built little by little.'

112. Jones to Mills, 20 January 1802, I.O. SLV/6.

113. Jones to Dundas, private, 27 March, 15 May 1802, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, ff. 161, 172. For details, see below, pp. 298–9.

114. Jones to Willis, private and secret, 17 July 1802, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

115. Jones to Inglis, 15 September 1801, K.C. MSS 9213; Jones to Willis, 30 June 1802 K.C. MSS 9214.

116. Jones to Scott, 15 September 1801, K.C. MSS 9213.

117. Jones to Willis, 4 December 1802, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

118. Elgin to Jones, 21 October 1801, *The Memoranda and Correspondence of Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh*, ed. marquess of Londonderry, London, 1848–54, v. 162; Jones to Dundas, 23 October 1802, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 311.

119. Manesty to Addington, 18 April 1804, I.O. G/29/24.

120. In 1808 Minto, anxious to experiment with Malcolm's policy of threat, failed to recall Jones from Persia.

121. Malcolm died in 1833. The *Transactions* appeared the following year.

122. Palmerston to Temple, 10 March 1835, Sir H. Bulwer, *Life of Viscount Palmerston* London, 1870–76, ii. 4–5.

123. Scott to Jones, 22 June 1801, *Scott*, ii. 318; Dundas to Jones, 12 November 1801, K.C. MSS 6505.

124. Willis to Jones, 2 October, 16 October 1801, K.C. MSS 6372–73.

125. Hawkesbury to St Helens, 5 May 1801, F.O. 65/48. Compare Rodger, *Second Coalition*, p. 279, that the war had 'ended on more or less equal terms', as if captured colonies were still accepted as the equal of territories in Europe.

126. *Parliamentary History of England*, ed. W. Corbett, London 1820, xxxvi. 154, 185, 776; Nelson to Addington, 4 December 1802, 28 June 1803, *The Despatches and Letters of Vice Admiral Lord Viscount Nelson*, ed. Sir H. Nicolas, London, 1844–46, v. 36, vi. 106. Addington,

with St Vincent in his cabinet, and a friend of Nelson, was more realistic than Pitt and Grenville about the strength and weakness of sea power.

127. Hawkesbury to Cornwallis, private, 14 November 16 November 1801, *The Correspondence of Charles, First Marquess Cornwallis*, ed. C. Ross, London, 1859, iii. 392–93.

128. Hawkesbury to Whitworth, 9 February 1803, *England and Napoleon in 1803: Being the Despatches of Lord Whitworth*, ed. O. Browning, London, 1887, p. 65.

129. Warren to Hawkesbury, 20 January 1803, F.O. 65/52.

130. Harcourt to Jones, private, 3 December 1802, K.C. MSS 8217.

131. Addington to Wellesley, secret, 28 September 1802, *The Wellesley Papers*, [ed. L. S. Benjamin], London, 1914, ii. 152.

132. Harcourt to Jones, private, 31 October 1802, K.C. MSS 6526.

133. Inglis to Jones, 10 September 1802, *Castlereagh*, v. 172.

134. Grenville to Addington, secret, 8 May 1801, *Dropmore MSS*, vii. 15; Elgin to Hawkesbury, most secret and confidential, 10 June, 12 June 1801, F.O. 78/32.

135. For a concise account, see J. Marlowe, *Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800–1956* 2nd edition: London, 1965, pp. 23–28.

136. Stuart to Hobart, 29 April 1802, W.O. 1/346, p. 33.

137. Stuart to Hobart, 18 October 1802, W.O. 1/346, p. 221.

138. Willis to Jones, 1 October, 19 October 1802, K.C. MSS 6599, 8169.

139. Jones to Inglis, 29 November 1802, K.C. MSS 8380.

140. Jones to Wellesley, 5 May 1802, with enclosure, Melville MSS. Add. MSS 41767, f. 208.

141. Jones to Willis, 12 March 1802, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742. 'Let me beg of you' remarked Jones 'to take up an Atlas to look at the Turkish empire, the Crimea, the ex-Venetian islands (which I think you will agree must in the end become actually though not nominally a Russian establishment) and Georgia. A word to the wise is enough, and I think Turco at any should have kept a better look out.'

142. *Castlereagh*, v. 173.

143. Castlereagh to Jones, private, 4 April 1803, K.C. MSS 7874.

144. Chairman of East India Company to pasha of Baghdad, 30 June 1803, I.O. L/PS/5/538.

145. Hawkesbury to Warren, 1 February 1803, F.O. 65/52.

146. Warren to Hawkesbury, 25 March 1803, F.O. 65/52.

147. He was also willing to move to Teheran. Jones to Willis, 12 August 1801, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

148. Lady Jones to Jones, 4 January 1804, K.C. MSS 7831.

149. Willis to Jones, 11 March, 17 May 1803, K.C. MSS 8172, 8167.

150. Philips, *East India Company*, pp. 118–19.

151. Innes to Jones, 23 March, 15 May 1804, K.C. MSS 7929.

152. Bosanquet to Jones, 5 June 1804, K.C. MSS 8310.

153. See Wellesley to Dundas, secret and confidential no. 8, 19 May 1799, Ingram, *Two Views of British India*, p. 154.

154. Minute of Bosanquet, 10 January 1804, I.O. L/PS/1/9.

155. Minute of the secret committee, 14 March 1804, I.O. L/PS/1/9.

156. Scott to Jones, 2 July 1804, K.C. MSS 8178.

157. Report by Elgin on Malta and the Levant, 28 February 1803, F.O. 78/38. An extract was published by J. Holland Rose in *English Historical Review*, xxxvi (1921), 234–36.

158. Elgin to Castlereagh, 30 November 1802, *Castlereagh*, v. 178; Elgin to Jones, private, 30 October 1802, K.C. MSS 6513.

159. Elgin to Jones, private, 18 December 1802, K.C. MSS 7918.

160. Elgin to Jones, 21 October 1801, *Castlereagh*, v. 162.

161. Jones to Willis, 4 December 1801, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.

162. Campbell to Jones, 25 July 1801, K.C. MSS 6309.

163. Jones to Dundas, private, 15 May 1802, Melville Mss, Add. MSS 41767, f. 172.

164. Enclosure in Jones to Dundas, 28 June 1802, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 269.

165. Jones to Willis, private and secret, 17 July 1802, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742. 'It is impossible properly to deny that an accident happening to the present government of Persia would not be very disastrous to us in its consequences, and I shudder to think of the king *being compelled* to lead a couple of thousand enraged fanatics into the frightful desert.'

166. Jones to Dundas, 18 July 1802, with enclosures, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 286.

167. Jones to Elgin, private and secret, 8 October 1802, K.C. MSS 9214.

168. Jones to Dundas, 23 October 1802, Melville MSS, Add. MSS 41767, f. 311.

169. Elgin to Hawkesbury, 22 November 1802, with enclosures, F.O. 78/36.
170. Jones to Elgin, most private and confidential, 1 October 1802, K.C. MSS 9214.
171. Jones to Willis, private and secret, 17 July 1802, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.
172. Jones to Willis, 9 January 1803, K.C. MSS 9214.
173. Jones to Bosanquet, 5 March 1804, *Castlereagh*, v. 239. Presumably the pasha, like the peshwa resisting the blandishments of Wellesley, knew what was involved.
174. Jones to Willis, 31 July 1803, K.C. MSS 9214.
175. Jones to Straton, most private and confidential, 25 July 1804, *Castlereagh*, v. 309.
176. Jones to Tooke, 6 July 1804, Boultibrooke MSS, National Library of Wales, MS 4905/E.
177. For Persian demands for British intervention in her quarrel with Russia, see Ingram, 'Anglo-Persian Relations', pp. 512–22.
178. Warren to Hawkesbury, secret and confidential, 16 December 1803, F.O. 65/53; same to same, 21 January 1804, F.O. 65/54.
179. Warren to Hawkesbury, most confidential, 30 July, 30 August 1804, F.O. 65/55.
180. Jones to Willis, 2 April 1804, I.O.L. Film. MSS 742.
181. Malcolm to Jones, 17 October 1801, K.C. MSS 6532. For details of Wellesley's policy, see above, Part II, pp. 190–2.
182. Sir J. Malcolm, *The Political History of India from 1784 to 1823* London, 1826, i. 192.
183. See Yapp, 'Residency at Baghdad', pp. 331–33.
184. Arbuthnot to Jones, 11 November 1805, I.O. Bombay SPC/382/14, p. 696.
185. Hobhouse to Taylor, confidential, 26 December 1838, Broughton MSS, I.O. H/839.
186. Jones to Inglis, 5 December 1802, K.C. MSS 9214.
187. J. Gallagher and R. Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Free Trade', *Economic History Review*, 2nd series, vi (1953), 1–15.